We study mechanisms for an allocation of goods among agents, where agents have no incentive to lie about their true values (incentive compatible) and for which no agent will seek to exchange outcomes with another (envy-free). Mechanisms satisfying each requirement separately have been studied extensively, but there are few results on mechanisms achieving both. We are interested in those allocations for which there exist payments such that the resulting mechanism is simultaneously incentive compatible and envy-free.
Introduction
We consider allocation problems, where a set U of objects should be allocated among m agents, each having a valuation function v i assigning a value to every bundle. We wish to find a partition of the objects among the agents so as to achieve some goal. Typically, this goal is to maximize (or approximate) the social welfare, i.e., the sum of the agents' valuations for their bundles. A mechanism M = a, p is a protocol that receives the set of the agents' valuations as input and returns a tuple consisting of an allocation a and payments p for the agents. The utility of an agent is the sum of valuations of the items minus any payments (quasi-linear utility).
Two natural desired properties of any mechanism are incentive compatibility and envy-freeness. A mechanism is incentive compatible if it is a dominant strategy for every agent to report her private information truthfully [5] . In 1987, Rochet [9] defined the notion of a cycle-monotonic allocation, and proved that this was a necessary and sufficient condition of an IC-implementable allocation -an allocation having associated payments that jointly form an incentive compatible mechanism. A mechanism is envy-free if no agent wishes to switch her outcome with that of another [2, 3, 10, 6, 7, 11] . The notion of locally efficient allocation has been defined by Haake et. al. [4] who showed that this was a necessary and sufficient condition of an EF-implementable allocation -allocation having associated payments that jointly form an envy-free mechanism.
While much work has been done on each of these properties independently, not much is yet understood about the interrelation between incentive compatibility and envy freeness The interaction between these two notions is the focus of our paper.
Our contribution is a characterization of allocations that are both incentive compatible and envy-free. We use this to derive various Pareto-optimal mechanisms that trade off envy freeness for incentive compatibility, we also use this to obtain negative results and to show separation results for different types of allocations and problems.
Envy-Free and Incentive-Compatible Allocations
Motivated by the cyclic monotonicity characterization of [9] and the locally efficient characterization of [4] we now consider two new categories of allocation functions:
EF ∪ IC-implementable: An allocation function a is called incentive compatible or envy-free implementable (EF ∪ IC-implementable) if there exists a payment function p such that M = a, p is incentive compatible and a (possibly different) payment function p ′ such that M = a, p ′ is envyfree.
EF ∩ IC-implementable: An allocation function a is incentive compatible and envy-free implementable (EF ∩ IC-implementable) if there exists a payment function p such that the mechanism M = a, p is incentive compatible and envy-free. Clearly, every function which is EF ∩ IC-implementable is also EF ∪ IC-implementable.
Many natural questions arise regarding the properties above: Are these classes identical? Empty? What interesting problems fall into each of these classes? Figure 1 gives different payment functions for the social welfare maximizing allocation of one indivisible item. It is easy to verify the properties claimed for the various payment functions. The social welfare maximizing allocation is indeed EF ∩ IC, Clarke pivots payments give a mechanism that is both incentive compatible and envy free (the third entry).
Payments Properties
Incentive compatible, not envy-free (VCG, not Clarke pivot payments)
Envy-free and incentive compatible (VCG with Clarke pivot payments) Figure 1 : Allocating a single item to the agent of highest valuation, (agent i), the utility of agent i is v i − p i , the utility of agents j = i is −p j .
In Section 3 we provide a characterization for allocations that are EF ∩ IC-implementable. We then use the obtained characterization to derive some useful observations regarding the spectrum of "best possible" tradeoffs between (approximate) envy-freeness and (approximate) incentive compatibility.
Finally, in Section 5 we explore the relationships between the different classes. In particular, we show that not every IC-implementable allocation is also EF -implementable, and vice versa. Additionally, using the characterization provided in Section 3, we show that not every IC ∪ EF -implementable allocation is also IC ∩ EF -implementable.
Preliminaries
Let U be a set of objects, and associated with agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is a valuation function v i ∈ V i that maps sets of objects into ℜ. Let v =< v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v m > be a sequence of valuation functions, and let (v ′ i , v −i ) be the sequence of valuation functions arrived by substituting
An allocation function 1 a maps a sequence of valuation functions v =< v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v m >, into a partition of U consisting of m parts, one for each agent. I.e.,
Payments are from the agent to the mechanism (if the payment is negative then this means that the transfer is from the mechanism to the agent).
A mechanism is a pair of functions, M = a, p , where a is an allocation function, and p is a payment function. For a sequence of valuation functions v = v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v m , the utility to agent i is defined as
. Such a utility function is known as quasi-linear.
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism:
A celebrated result in mechanism design is the family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms. A mechanism M = a, p is called a VCG mechanism if:
, and
, the VCG mechanism is incentive compatible (See, e.g., [8] ). The Clarke pivot payment for a VCG mechanism takes
We next define mechanisms that are IC, EF, or both IC and EF.
• A mechanism is incentive compatible if it is a dominant strategy for every agent to reveal her true valuation function to the mechanism. I.e., if for all i, v, and v ′ i :
this is equivalent to:
• A mechanism is envy-free if no agent seeks to switch her allocation and payment with another. I.e., if for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m and all v:
• A mechanism (a, p) is incentive compatible and envy-free if (a, p) is both incentive compatible and envy-free.
Characterizing Allocations that are EF ∩ IC-implementable
Before presenting our characterization for allocations that are EF ∩ IC-implementable, we present several known characterizations. 
Theorem 3.2. ([4]) A necessary and sufficient condition for an allocation function a to be EF -implementable is that a is locally efficient.
Definition 3.3. (Cycle monotonicity [9] ) We require Rochet's notion of cyclic monotonicity : an allocation function satisfies cycle monotonicity if for every player i, every integer K, and every
where
Note that the summand is the same as the expression in Equation (1).
Theorem 3.4. ([9]) A necessary and sufficient condition that an allocation function is IC-implementable
is that it is cycle monotonic.
The Graph G a
For an allocation function a, let G a be a weighted digraph with vertices (i, v), where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and v =< v 1 , . . . , v m > is a sequence of valuation functions. The arcs of the graph are classified as either EF arcs or IC arcs as follows:
• IC arcs:
If we consider only EF arcs, then G a consists of vertex disjoint complete digraphs, each of which corresponds to a different v. An allocation is EF -implementable if and only if there are no negative cycles of EF arcs in G a . This is equivalent to the locally efficient characterization of Theorem 3.2.
If we consider only IC arcs, then G a consists of vertex disjoint complete digraphs, each of which corresponds to a different pair i and v −i . An allocation is IC-implementable if and only if there are no negative cycles of IC arcs in G a . This is equivalent to the cycle monotone characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms of Theorem 3.4.
This suggests the following characterization of allocations that are EF ∩ IC-implementable: 
such that the following two conditions hold:
• For any EF arc e = ((j, v),
If we sum up these inequalities over the set of arcs forming a cycle (consisting of alternate IC and EF arcs), we get that the sum of arc weights must be non-negative as the right hand sides cancel out. If G a does not contain a negative cycle, we can compute shortest paths from any arbitrary start vertex (i, v), and interpret the length of the shortest path from (i, v) to a vertex (j, v ′ ) as p j (v ′ ). Shortest paths obey the required condition.
It follows that an allocation is EF ∪ IC-implementable (potentially different payments for incentive compatibility and for envy-freeness) if and only if all negative cycles in G a include at least one EF arc and at least one IC arc. Figure 2 (in Appendix 5) helps visualize G a by illustrating a subgraph of a G a that contains a cycle of EF and IC arcs that is not a union of complete IC and EF cycles (this 8-node subgraph is the smallest subgraph with this property.)
Trading Envy for Truthfulness

Tradeoffs between approximate envy-freeness and approximate incentive compatibility
A mechanism (a, p) has ∆-approximate envy-freeness if for all v, all
agent envies another by more than ∆). Similarly, (a, p) has ∆-approximate incentive compatibility if no agent has incentive to lie that is larger than ∆, i.e. for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, for all v and we obtain payments (and a mechanism) with c efapproximate envy-freeness and c ic -approximate incentive compatibility. A cycle-correcting pair (c ef , c ic ) is minimal if there is no cycle-correcting pair (x, y) = (c ef , c ic ) such that x ≤ c ef and y ≤ c ic .
The set T a of minimal cycle-correcting pairs defines a tradeoff between approximate envy-freeness and approximate incentive compatibility of the allocation function a. If a is EF ∩ IC-implementable, then T a = {(0, 0)}. If a is EF -implementable (but not necessarily IC-implementable), there is a point of the form (0, c ic ) ∈ T a . The corresponding mechanism is envy-free and has the best possible (that is, c icapproximate) incentive compatibility subject to envy-freeness. Similarly, if a is IC-implementable, there is a point (c ef , 0) ∈ T a with a corresponding incentive compatible mechanism that has the best possible (that is, c ef -approximate) envy freeness subject to incentive compatibility. These "best" tradeoffs can be computed in time polynomial in the size of G f (minimum ratio cycles [1] ).
Partition based on Trustworthiness
Assume that one can find either envy free or truthful prices, but not both. Then, one can find prices that enforce envy freeness for some of the agents, and truthfulness for the complement, and can choose how to classify the agents.
Consider the EF and IC arcs graph such that there are no negative cycles of only IC or only EF arcs, but there might be a mixed cycle. In particular, any negative cycle must include a vertex where the arc entering the vertex is an EF arc and the arc exiting the vertex is an IC arc.
We do as follows: We remove all IC arcs entering (i, X) where i is trusted, and remove all EF arcs entering (i, X) where i is untrusted. Any negative cycle must include both trusted and untrusted agents (otherwise it is limited to edges of one type). There are no EF edges from trusted to untrusted vertices, and IC edges only connect vertices associated with the same agent. Thus, there is no cycle including both trusted and untrusted vertices.
It follows that no trusted agent will be envious, since envy is prevented by the incoming EF edges. Likewise, no untrusted agent has incentive to lie, this is guaranteed by the incoming IC edges 2 .
Separation Examples
Figure 2: A cycle in G a that includes two agents (1 and 2), and two valuation functions for each, {v 0 1 , v 1 1 } for agent 1, {v 0 2 , v 1 2 } for agent 2. The valuation functions for all other agents are fixed in this cycle.
In this section we prove that not every allocation that is IC-implementable is also EF -implementable, and vice versa. Additionally, we show that not every allocation that is IC ∪ EF -implementable is also IC ∩ EF -implementable.
Claim 5.1. Not every allocation that is IC-implementable is also EF -implementable.
Proof. Consider a single item auction and give it to agent 1. If the mechanism pays nothing to any agent this is incentive compatible. However, there is no payment function that makes this envy-free, this allocation is not locally efficient (and thus not EF -implementable) unless agent 1 has the highest valuation.
Claim 5.2. Not every allocation that is EF -implementable is also IC-implementable.
Proof. Consider a single divisible good. Let a i (v) = α i denote what fraction of the good is given to agent i, where
For the examples below, we take the valuation function to be proportional, i.e., for all i, v i (a i (v)) = α i z i , z i is agent i's value of the entire object.
Consider the following assignment function:
This assignment is locally efficient, but the fraction assigned to an agent does not monotonically increase with the agent valuation. This contradicts cyclic monotonicity (on a cycle of length 2). Claim 5.3. Not every allocation that is IC ∪ EF -implementable is also IC ∩ EF -implementable.
Proof. Consider a single divisible good and three agents {1, 2, 3} where each of the agents, 1 and 2, can choose one of two specific valuation functions: Agent i = 1, 2, has valuation function v i ∈ {v 0 i , v 1 i }, and agent 3 has only one valuation function, v 3 .
As before, let z
(1) (the valuation for the entire good). Consider a setting where
2 , v 3 ) and consider the allocation a 11 1 = a 11 2 = 0.4, a 11 3 = 0.2 and for b 1 b 2 ∈ {00, 01, 10}, a
We show that a is IC-implementable (all IC cycles in G a are nonnegative). Any IC cycle must involve one of the agents {1, 2} (agent 3 can not change valuations) and the two valuations of this agent. There are four IC cycles (2-cycles) with weights, for b 1 b 2 ∈ {0, 1},:
(Using the property that for any agent i ∈ {1, 2}, fixing the valuation of other agents, the fraction allocated is nondecreasing with valuation (weak monotonicity).)
One could argue directly that all EF cycles in G a are nonnegative and therefore a is EF -implementable. It is easier to see that a is locally efficient. The two agents 1 and 2 always receive the same fraction and agent 3, whose valuation is smaller, receives a smaller fraction.
We now show that G a has a negative cycle, and therefore, using Theorem 3.5, a is not EF ∩ ICimplementable. Consider the 8-cycle C 8 (see Figure 2 ) over players 1, 2 and valuations (v This cycle has two arcs with nonzero weights (the 4th and the 6th arcs) and has weight w(C 8 ) = 0.1(z 0 1 − z 1 2 ) < 0.
